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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the Slaughter-House Cases,1 Justice Field accused the majority 
of turning the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause2 into a “vain and idle enactment which accomplished nothing,”3 
and Justice Swayne argued that the majority “turn[ed] . . . what was 
meant for bread into a stone.”4  Most contemporary commentators 
appear to agree.5  Robert Bork went so far as to compare that clause to a 
provision “written in Sanskrit” or “obliterated past deciphering by an ink 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law.  I appreciate assistance from my 
colleagues, Jeff Jackson and Bill Merkel, who provided helpful feedback during the preparation of 
this article.  I am also grateful for the support from Richard Aynes and participants in The 
University of Akron’s 14th Amendment Symposium, with particular thanks to David Bogen for his 
insight and guidance. 
 1. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
 3. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 5. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 627 (1994) 
(noting that “‘everyone’ agrees the Court incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
. . .”). 
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blot.”6  Did the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment make a colossal 
mistake?  Or were Justices Field and Swayne correct when they blamed 
Justice Miller’s majority opinion in Slaughter-House for leading the 
nation astray?  Answers to these questions, in the pages that follow, are 
“no” to the first, and a qualified “no” to the second.  The phrase 
“privileges or immunities” made sense at the time when Congressman 
Bingham and his colleagues inserted it into the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Contemporary misunderstanding of that clause reflects continuing 
failure to appreciate positive aspects of the framework offered by Justice 
Miller in 1873. 
II.  FEDERALISM (NOT JUST THE BILL OF RIGHTS) 
In the hundred and forty years following ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, much of the debate has focused upon 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.  Many commentators argue that the 
framers of the Amendment intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights 
when they drafted the Privileges or Immunities Clause.7  Detractors who 
argue against incorporation ask, among other things, why the framers did 
not simply use that language if their intent was to make states subject to 
the Bill of Rights.8  The Supreme Court muddled these issues, rejecting 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a basis for incorporation in the 
Slaughter-House Cases9 and then using the Due Process Clause to 
accomplish virtually all of the same goals.  Because the Supreme Court 
used the “wrong clause,” however, academic debate continues 
unabated.10 
The central thesis of the following discussion is that this debate has 
been too narrow; the phrase “privileges or immunities” was chosen 
because the framers had more than the Bill of Rights in mind when they 
promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment, and incorporation of the Bill of 
 
 6. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
166 (1990). 
 7. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The 
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1098-1124 (2000). 
 8. See, e.g., D.O. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 
IOWA L. BULL. 219, 233 (1918). 
 9. 83 U.S. 36, 77-79 (1873). 
 10. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
181-230 (1998) (proposing a “refined model of incorporation” of the Bill of Rights into the 
Fourteenth Amendment); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (citing historical evidence in support of 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to 
Michael Curtis’ Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983). 
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Rights would only accomplish a portion of their objectives.  The framers 
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment to assure state compliance with 
rights derived from federal law in a broad sense.  They chose the phrase 
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” specifically to 
meet this objective. 
For an illustration of this point, consider the case of Samuel Hoar.  
In 1844, Massachusetts sent Hoar as an emissary to South Carolina to 
protest that state’s imprisonment of British and American seamen with 
African ancestry who arrived in the port of Charleston.11  The South 
Carolina legislature denounced Hoar, claiming the state’s right to 
exclude “free negroes and persons of color” who could not be United 
States citizens and therefore were not protected by “the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States.”12  Hoar hastily retreated, 
fearing for his life.13  The Hoar affair became a cause célèbre, with 
southern states rallying to the support of South Carolina,14 while the 
Massachusetts legislature invoked the need for congressional action to 
protect the citizens of that state.15  Rather than dying a quiet death, the 
controversy sparked debate in Congress both before and after the Civil 
War.16  In his first speech on the floor of Congress supporting what 
became the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman John Bingham 
decried the lack of safety for a Massachusetts citizen in the streets of 
Charleston, and denounced South Carolina for “utterly disregard[ing] . . . 
the privileges and immunities” of Samuel Hoar.17 
While the reference to Hoar could be characterized as an example 
of the need to incorporate the Bill of Rights, protecting the right of all 
Americans to exercise freedom of speech and to petition state 
governments, that depiction misses a larger point.  Hoar traveled to 
South Carolina to denounce that state’s defiance of Commerce Clause 
and Treaty Clause protection for the right of free navigation.18  He 
 
 11. Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, The United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822-
1845, 1 J. S. HIST. 3, 22 (1935). 
 12. 5 STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 
238 (Herman V. Ames ed., 1900) [hereinafter STATE DOCUMENTS]. 
 13. See Hamer, supra note 11, at 23. 
 14. STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 237. 
 15. Hamer, supra note 11, at 23. 
 16. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 748 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) 
(listing seventeen pages with references to the “Hoar incident in South Carolina” during debates 
surrounding promulgation of the Civil War Amendments).  This account does not include a number 
of implied references to the same events. 
 17. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866). 
 18. See Hamer, supra note 11, at 22-23.  Supreme Court Justice William Johnson had 
previously issued a circuit court opinion stating that South Carolina’s law violated both Commerce 
3
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planned to argue that the South Carolina law conflicted with “the 
express provisions or fundamental principles of the national compact.”19  
The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
drafted for the broad purpose of assuring that individuals would be able 
to enforce federal law against state authorities.20 
An assessment of congressional debates and subsequent treatment 
of these issues leads to identification of three categories of “rights” that 
fall within the scope of “privileges or immunities.”21  The first category 
includes rights directly defined in the constitutional text and determined 
to be applicable to the states.  The Bill of Rights as currently 
incorporated into the Due Process Clause fits within this definition, and 
so do rights found in Article I, sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution as 
well as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV section 2.  A 
second category involves rights derived from acts of Congress 
specifically authorized by the Constitution.  This category would include 
Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause rights such as those that should 
have protected the seamen who entered Charleston Harbor.22  It would 
also include patent rights or bankruptcy rights as subsequently defined 
by Congress.23  The third category includes those interstitial rights which 
may be fairly inferred from the Constitution.  The “right to travel,” 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe,24 fits within this 
definition; the Supreme Court first identified this right in 1867 with its 
decision striking down a capitation tax in Crandall v. State of Nevada.25 
 
and Treaty Clause powers of Congress, but dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.  See Elkison 
v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 495-96, 498 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). 
 19. Hamer, supra note 11, at 22.  President Andrew Jackson and his Attorney General Roger 
Taney had refused to take action against South Carolina, with Taney expressing the view that “[t]he 
African race in the United States even when free . . . were not looked upon as citizens by the 
contracting parties who formed the Constitution” and were therefore not protected by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV.  DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE 
DRED SCOTT CASE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (1981). 
 20. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 
YALE L.J. 57, 70-73 (1993) (noting John Bingham’s emphasis on federal authority to enforce, “at a 
minimum,” the Bill of Rights). 
 21. See William J. Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing 
Congressional Power to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
235, 249-82 (2001) (providing a more detailed development of this background). 
 22. See Elkison, 8 F. Cas. at 495-96. 
 23. See An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and 
Copyrights, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (July 8, 1870); see William J. Rich, Taking “Privileges or 
Immunities” Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 204, 216 
(2002). 
 24. 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). 
 25. 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867).  The right to privacy or personal autonomy arguably may also fit 
within this definition, although there is no reason to pursue that controversy within this paper. 
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The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment aptly chose the phrase 
“privileges or immunities” to reflect this combination of interests.  
Although the terms were familiar enough to lawmakers, having already 
appeared in the text of the Constitution with respect to rights of state 
citizens, their meaning had only been discussed at length in one prior 
federal court opinion.  In Corfield v. Coryell,26 Justice Bushrod 
Washington devoted a page of text to the meaning of the phrase, but did 
little to provide clarity beyond holding that it did not prohibit all state 
laws according different treatment to citizens and non-citizens.27  He did 
include “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and 
possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and 
safety” subject to “such restraints as the government may justly 
prescribe for the general good of the whole.”28 
Omitted from the framework described above is the argument made 
by dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases that the Fourteenth 
Amendment gave Congress control over substantive rights that fall 
within the scope of state privileges and immunities.29  Congress had 
gained authority to enforce the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause when non-residents of a state were discriminated against, but not 
to rewrite the laws encompassed by that clause.30  As drafted and as 
defended during the ratification debates, the Fourteenth Amendment 
Privileges or Immunities Clause only extended federal authority to rights 
directly linked, either explicitly or implicitly, to the national 
government.31 
III.  CONGRESS (NOT THE SUPREME COURT) 
During the ratification debates, critics of the phrase “privileges or 
immunities” voiced concerns that the text swept too broadly and 
enlarged federal power without providing clear guidance regarding the 
 
 26. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (concluding that a statutory scheme to seize 
the boats of non-residents who unlawfully gather oysters was not a violation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause). 
 27. Id. at 551-52. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 96 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 30. See id. at 77 (“[W]hatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own 
citizens, . . . the same . . . shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your 
jurisdiction.”). 
 31. See Rich, supra note 23, at 167-73. 
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boundaries of that power.32  Reassurance by advocates of the Fourteenth 
Amendment consisted in significant part of expressions that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not expand the substantive scope of 
existing protection.33  Some have taken such statements as implied 
rejections of incorporation,34 in spite of repeated favorable references to 
the Bill of Rights.35  While rejecting those assessments, a more 
substantial contemporary concern is that focus upon the Bill of Rights 
debate has side-tracked scholars from a primary reason for choosing the 
phrase “privileges or immunities.”  The framers were more likely to 
have been concerned about the role of Congress in defining those rights 
that would be enforceable against the states.36 
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment began with fears that the 
Thirteenth Amendment failed to give Congress adequate authority to 
enact early civil rights legislation.37  The framers therefore focused on 
expanding that power, and it is reasonable to believe that they foresaw a 
predominant role for Congress in defining the scope of the Amendment.  
The Privileges or Immunities Clause corresponds to that focus, 
especially when judged in light of the broad definition of that phrase 
extant at the time.  Given that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 32. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 133 (1866) (Congressman Rogers 
challenging the broad extension of federal power represented by the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause). 
 33. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (Congressman Bingham, 
assuring that “the proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the Union, or any citizen 
of any State of the Union, any obligation which is not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of 
the Constitution”). 
 34. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 36 (1949) (asking “if Bingham’s object was to make the provisions of 
the first eight Amendments applicable to the states, why did he not say so?”). 
 35. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-68 (arguing that references to “privileges” or 
“immunities” in years prior to promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment “all were understood to 
encompass, among other things, the protections of the federal Bill of Rights”). 
 36. Contemplation of an active congressional role in defining “privileges or immunities,” 
rather than direct judicial enforcement, could also explain the lack of concern about possible 
discontinuity between the Bill of Rights and existing state constitutions with respect to issues such 
as grand jury indictment.  Thus, congressional enforcement power could be seen as a vehicle for 
achieving “selective incorporation.”  But see Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 77-78 (1963) (finding “no evidence . . . that anyone 
thought or intended that the amendment should impose on the states a selective incorporation”). 
 37. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 30 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to “embody and protect” the Civil Rights Act of 1866); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 346-49 (1985) (noting an intent to provide constitutional 
authority for enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
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were focusing on federalism issues,38 there are good reasons to believe 
that members of Congress were chiefly concerned about their own 
legislative authority as distinct from the authority of the courts. 
Admittedly, the framers were aware of problems associated with 
judicial interpretation of constitutional text, especially as visited upon 
the nation in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.39  They crafted the 
Fourteenth Amendment in part to overrule the racist assumptions upon 
which that case was based,40 thereby sending a message to the Supreme 
Court to avoid such debacles in the future.  “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States” were given citizenship status and 
protected from discriminatory treatment.41  But it was emphatically 
Congress that was given the “power to enforce” the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.42 
Congress accepted that challenge with enactment of the Ku Klux 
Klan Act of 1871 (also known as The Civil Rights Act of 1871), which 
imposed liability on persons who “under color of any law . . . cause . . . 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution of the United States.”43  The purpose of this law was 
explained by Congressman Bingham, primary sponsor of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, who sought to “provide by law for the better enforcement 
of the Constitution and laws of the United States.”44  In 1874, a 
Committee on Revision of the Laws, charged with the responsibility to 
“amend the imperfections of the original text” without altering 
meaning,45 revised language from the Ku Klux Klan Act to develop what 
we now find in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, protecting “any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the federal 
government.46  With this language, Congress communicated the broadly 
accepted understanding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was to 
be co-extensive with rights found within the text of the Constitution as 
well as rights defined by Congress exercising its authority as defined by 
Article I of the Constitution.  Today, federal statutory rights may be 
 
 38. See supra notes 7-31 and accompanying text. 
 39. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 40. Both sides of the Slaughter-House debate appear to agree on this point.  See Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873) (noting the purpose of providing “freedom of the slave race”); 
id. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting) (noting reversal from Dred Scott). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 43. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 13. 
 44. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 81 (1871). 
 45. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, § 2, 14 Stat. 74, 75. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).  
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enforced by invoking § 1983,47 but few appear to remember that 
authority for doing so may be traced to the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause. 
IV.  JUSTICE MILLER WAS NOT THE ENEMY 
Few Supreme Court justices have been more savagely attacked than 
Justice Samuel Miller,48 and few opinions have been subject to such 
prolonged criticism as Justice Miller’s opinion in the Slaughter-House 
Cases.49  The criticism looks good in hindsight; subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions rejected incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and Slaughter-House opened the door 
for those decisions.  Casting blame in that manner, however, distracts 
from a more charitable view of the Slaughter-House framework which 
retains contemporary significance.50 
Misunderstanding of Slaughter-House begins with a failure to 
appreciate the competing ideologies of the litigants in that case.  John A. 
Campbell, who represented the plaintiffs, was a former U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice who shared responsibility for the Dred Scott decision as a 
member of that Court, and who resigned from that office to join the 
Confederacy.51  He was also a disciple of John C. Calhoun.52  Attorneys 
on the other side of the argument were followers of Daniel Webster, who 
had opposed secession and organized an army to support President 
Jackson’s battle against nullification.53  After reviewing this alignment 
of counsel, some may argue that the plaintiffs’ attorneys were 
abandoning their historical ideological commitments by challenging 
state authority to regulate the butchers of New Orleans and advocating 
 
 47. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5 (1980) (explaining that § 1983 “was intended to 
provide a remedy to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally 
protected rights”). 
 48. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED 
AND UNNAMED 55 (1997) (characterizing Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House as “probably 
the worst holding, in its effect on human rights, ever uttered by the Supreme Court”). 
 49. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 50. For a more favorable view of Justice Miller’s perspective in Slaughter-House, see 
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE 
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 201-10 (2003) (describing Justice Miller’s 
background as a physician, his support for public health measures, and his support for the biracial 
government in Louisiana that enacted the Slaughter-House regulations). 
 51. See id. at 200; Michael Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the Slaughter-House 
Cases, 18 TUL. L. REV. 1, 88 (1943). 
 52. Franklin, supra note 51, at 88. 
 53. Id. at 52. 
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national oversight.54  An alternative perspective suggests that Chief 
Justice Miller and others in the majority understood that the plaintiffs 
were attempting to promote individual property rights, and in that sense 
the plaintiffs’ arguments remained in line with their prior commitment to 
the owners of slaves.55  Calhoun’s arguments for states’ rights were 
based upon an assumption that South Carolina would retain the 
institution of slavery, and his conservative ideology had as much to do 
with preserving individual property rights as with restraining the 
national government.56 
Ironically, one of the few cases subjected to as many academic 
attacks as Slaughter-House is Lochner v. New York.57  The losing 
argument in Slaughter-House eventually prevailed in Lochner.58  Justice 
Field’s dissenting opinion in Slaughter-House cited at length to the 
views of Adam Smith.59  Justices Bradley and Swayne were equally 
devoted to protecting property rights in their broadest form, with Justice 
Swayne arguing that “[p]roperty is everything which has an 
exchangeable value, and the right of property includes the power to 
dispose of it according to the will of the owner.”60  The opinions of 
Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne coincide with those of the Court 
majority in 1905, which concluded that freedom of contract principles 
should prevail over protective labor legislation.61 
In contrast, Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House took a 
decidedly cautious approach toward striking down state measures 
designed to protect public health.  While there are phrases in his opinion 
which, with the benefit of hindsight, suggest an unduly limited scope for 
the Fourteenth Amendment,62 the basic framework that he described for 
 
 54. See, e.g., Aynes, supra note 5, at 657. 
 55. See Rich, supra note 23, at 179.  In contemporary terms, it would be the same as an 
expectation that Justice Thomas, who grew up in South Carolina and appears to follow the ideology 
of Calhoun and his compatriots, would promote states’ rights over those of the federal government 
and would also champion the rights of private property owners over regulatory authority of the 
states. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 58. See Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising 
the Slaughter-House Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 59. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 110 n. 39 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (citing 1 
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, ch. 10, part 2.). 
 60. Id. at 127 (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
 61. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
 62. E.g., after describing the “pervading purpose” of the Civil War amendments to the 
Constitution, Justice Miller described discrimination against emancipated slaves as the “evil to be 
9
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interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause parallels major 
components of the approach described in this article.63  Miller explicitly 
refers to both the navigation rights and the interstitial right to freedom of 
travel as examples of privileges or immunities.64  He rejected a meaning 
that would have incorporated the writings of Adam Smith (or Herbert 
Spencer) into the Constitution, and history demonstrates the wisdom of 
that response.65  Presumably, for those who pillory Justice Miller’s 
opinion while also condemning the Supreme Court decision in 
Lochner,66 the Slaughter-House dissenters surely do not offer much in 
the way of a positive alternative.67 
A primary focus of Justice Miller’s interpretation of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was his effort to dispel belief that new substantive 
rights were to be identified and defined by the courts, without having an 
independent basis in the Constitution or laws of the United States 
government.68  Instead, the Clause protected those rights that “owe their 
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its 
Constitution, or its laws.”69  The first example he gave was the case of 
Crandall v. Nevada,70 a case from 1867 in which Justice Miller had 
established the right of United States citizens to travel freely from one 
state to another.71  The right to travel falls within a more general 
category of rights derived from the “national character” of the 
government.72 
Justice Miller illustrated a second category of protections embodied 
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause by reference to the “right to 
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances” and the 
“privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,” both of which were identified 
 
remedied” by the Equal Protection Clause, doubting whether other actions would “come within the 
purview” of that provision.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81. 
 63. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
 64. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.  
 65. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum 
wage law for women, and signaling the demise of Lochner). 
 66. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES, 140, 162 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (with chapters describing Slaughter-
House as “disastrous” and Lochner as a “tragedy”). 
 67. A more entrenched version of Lochner may have been even more difficult to reverse than 
the opinion that Justices Holmes and Harlan so effectively dissented from in 1905. 
 68. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 78 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
transform the Supreme Court into a “perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States”). 
 69. Id. at 79. 
 70. 73 U.S. 35 (1867). 
 71. Id. at 44. 
 72. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79. 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss4/5
10-RICH.DOC 7/6/2009  12:05 PM 
2009] WHY “PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES”? 1121 
as “rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”73  With 
this language, Justice Miller incorporated individual rights which the 
text of the Constitution identified only in relation to Congress.74  One 
may argue that he referred to the right of petition, rather than to other 
provisions embodied in the Bill of Rights, because of the drama 
associated with Samuel Hoar, which remained on the minds of those 
who understood the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.75  Several 
authors have noted that Miller’s reference to the right of petition is 
consistent with broader arguments for incorporation.76  On balance, 
Professor David Bogen makes a stronger argument that Miller’s 
reference to a “right to petition,” although ambiguous, was intended only 
to limit state interference with the right to petition the national 
government;77 that interpretation became manifest two years later with 
Chief Justice Waite’s decision in United States v. Cruikshank.78 
A final category of protections identified by Justice Miller was 
derived from federal law, and illustrated by reference to both navigation 
and treaty rights.79  Again, the use of illustrations that were of central 
concern to Samuel Hoar seems more than merely coincidental.80  More 
important than the specific context, however, was the embrace of laws 
derived from the powers assigned to Congress and the national 
government as a source of privileges or immunities. 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 
342 (2003). 
 75. See William J. Rich, Lessons of Charleston Harbor: The Rise, Fall and Revival of Pro-
Slavery Federalism, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 569, 586 (2005). 
 76. See Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 683 (2000); Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of 
Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 
U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 750-51; Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early 
Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1111-15 (2000).  See also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans 
Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future – or Reveal the Structure 
of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 183-84 (1999) (“It was only a series of later decisions that 
oddly attributed to Justice Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases the expulsion of 
the Bill of Rights from the privileges or immunities cathedral, an expulsion nowhere to be found on 
the face of the Miller opinion and indeed inconsistent with much of its language and logic.”). 
 77. See Bogen, supra note 74, at 376-77 (concluding, after noting the ambiguity in the 
Slaughter-House text, that “Miller fully intended to repudiate any theory of incorporation”). 
 78. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1875) (citing Slaughter-House for a distinction between rights of state 
and national citizenship). 
 79. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1873). 
 80. See Rich, supra note 75, at 606-07. 
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Some have questioned the importance of this implied restatement of 
federal supremacy.81  Justice Miller downplays the significance of this 
third category through his broad description of state police powers, 
which he viewed as outside of the ambit of federal privileges or 
immunities.82  His relatively limited conception of federal power was 
consistent with the understanding of congressional authority in the late 
nineteenth century.  Since that time, however, dimensions of federal 
power have expanded dramatically, as illustrated by contemporary 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause.83 
Subsequent generations accepted the link that Justice Miller drew 
between the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Supremacy Clause, 
beginning with congressional enactment of what we now know as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.84  Thomas Cooley’s 1880 treatise explained that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected rights to participate in foreign 
or domestic commerce, benefits of postal laws, and navigation and travel 
rights because “over all of these subjects the jurisdiction of the United 
States extends, and they are covered by its laws.”85  A widely recognized 
article from 1918 by Professor D. O. McGovney explained that, to 
understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause, counsel must simply 
ask “what provision or text of Federal law creates or grants this alleged 
privilege or immunity.”86  More contemporary commentators reinforced 
this understanding, although doing so in disparaging terms, expressing 
the lack of any “independent function [of the Privileges or Immunities 
 
 81. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 1675 (Johnny H. Killian, George A. Costello & Kenneth R. Thomas eds., 2004) 
(stating that the Slaughter-House Cases reduced the Privileges or Immunities Clause to “a 
superfluous reiteration of a prohibition already operative against the states”). 
 82. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77-78. 
 83. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the congressional power to 
regulate interstate commerce includes prohibiting local cultivation and use of marijuana); Perez v. 
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that the portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
prohibiting “loan sharking” activities is within Congress’s power to control activities affecting 
interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congress had 
ample basis upon which to find that racial discrimination at restaurants, which received from out of 
state a substantial portion of food served, had a direct and adverse effect on interstate commerce). 
 84. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
 85. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 245 (1880). 
 86. McGovney, supra note 8, at 225.  Prof. McGovney’s article was recognized by the 
Association of American Law Schools in 1938 as part of a collection of essays considered to have 
“permanent value.”  SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at v (Ass’n of Am. Law Schools 
ed. 1938). 
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Clause], except as an alternative to using the Supremacy Clause.”87  
Both the history leading up to the Civil War88 and contemporary 
experience,89 however, demonstrate the importance of this element of the 
framework described by Justice Miller. 
IV.  CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS 
The Supreme Court got it right when the justices decided in 1999 
that the right of new state residents to enjoy the same privileges as those 
accorded to long term residents is derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause.90  Justice Stevens’ opinion 
for the Court cites Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion as authority 
for that conclusion,91 and by doing so revives the first component of the 
constitutional framework derived from that text. 
Although the second segment of Justice Miller’s framework could 
have been expanded to incorporate provisions of the Bill of Rights,92 
conceptions of sovereignty accepted by Miller, and at least some of his 
colleagues,93 constrained that development.  The significance of that 
loss, however, should not be overstated.94  The Incorporation Doctrine 
should now be treated as settled law; contemporary battles over that 
issue sustain interesting academic squabbles, but have little likelihood of 
changing judicial treatment of the rights of American citizens.  Thus, 
although the second component of Justice Miller’s framework may not 
be linked to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, analogous protection 
extends from contemporary due process analysis.  While perhaps 
unsatisfactory to constitutional purists, this solution meets the needs of 
those victimized by state abuse. 
 
 87. Todd Zubler, The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to 
Take a Hike, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 893, 917 (1997). 
 88. See Rich, supra note 75, at 578-99 (describing actions against black seamen, the Hoar 
affair, the nullification crisis, and secession, all representing challenges to national sovereignty). 
 89. See Rich, supra note 21, at 284-92 (describing Supreme Court decisions barring 
individual monetary relief from state violations of federal law). 
 90. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999) (striking down limits on welfare 
assistance granted to new residents based upon their state of origin). 
 91. Id. at 503. 
 92. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 93. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549-50 (1875) (citing Slaughter-House for 
the proposition that national and state governments remained “distinct,” and noting that “[t]he 
powers which one possesses, the other does not”).  Only Justice Clifford dissented from this 
opinion.  Id. at 559-69. 
 94. See Bogen, supra note 74, at 392-93 (concluding that the recognition of substantive due 
process and incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause protects 
fundamental rights and remains consistent with the framers’ intent). 
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It is the third component of the Slaughter-House framework which 
appears to have been lost in the shadow of recent ideological battles 
within the Supreme Court.  In a series of opinions, five Supreme Court 
justices decided that rights derived from federal law stemming from 
congressional exercise of its power pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution are constrained by the Eleventh Amendment.95  Those 
justices substitute their own conventional wisdom for the actual text and 
history of the Eleventh Amendment and for the conceptions of 
sovereignty existing at the time the Eleventh Amendment was 
promulgated.96  They concede the fact that the Due Process and Equal 
Protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment override the 
Eleventh Amendment,97 but then circumscribe congressional authority to 
interpret those clauses.  To date, they have totally ignored the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.98 
The result of recent Supreme Court decisions limiting 
congressional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment is a 
fundamentally incoherent conception of federalism generally, and of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular.  The Supreme Court 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is at odds with conceptions of 
sovereignty that gave rise to the language in that text.99  In more 
particular terms, the justices acknowledge that language in 42 U.S.C. § 
 
 95. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (barring private 
parties from bringing complaints against state agencies to the Federal Maritime Commission); Bd. 
of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred private enforcement of the Americans With Disabilities Act against states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding Congress could not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
when it authorized private enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that states are immune from enforcement of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in state court); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that patent rights could not be enforced against states); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that the Commerce Clause did not give 
Congress authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment). 
 96. See Rich, supra note 75, at 575-77 (noting that the Eleventh Amendment incorporated a 
conception of separate state and federal sovereignty, and that contemporary conceptions of state 
sovereign immunity in the context of legitimate federal power may be traced to nineteenth century 
states’ rights advocacy aimed at preserving slavery). 
 97. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (quoting 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). 
 98. See id. at 374 (concluding that the scope of the Equal Protection Clause did not 
encompass rights protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 99. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 24 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(noting that “numerous scholars have exhaustively and conclusively refuted the contention that the 
Eleventh Amendment embodies a general grant of sovereign immunity to the States”). 
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1983 provides for enforcement of federal statutes,100 but have never 
addressed the relationship between § 1983’s language and the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.101  By ignoring this relationship, the Court is left 
with untenable conclusions, such as the decision that states may freely 
violate federal patent law with impunity.102  Bankruptcy law has become 
similarly twisted in order to avoid the unworkable implication that states 
are immune from judgments deriving their authority from federal 
statutes.103 
Why is this so important?  In a broader context, scholars categorize 
rights in both “negative” and “positive” terms.104  Negative rights 
impose constraints on government, and, to the regret of some,105 the Bill 
of Rights, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause have 
all been limited to that category.106  Those who believe in the importance 
of positive rights,107 however, may see the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as a repository of such rights.108  By their nature, positive rights 
lend themselves to legislative control, and, properly understood, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause recognizes such congressional action.109  
Authority to establish positive rights that states must adhere to or face 
 
 100. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1989) 
(accepting the National Labor Relations Act as an example of “rights, privileges or immunities” 
protected by § 1983). 
 101. See Rich, supra note 21, at 298.  As noted by David Bogen, this argument may not be 
persuasive to those current justices who refuse to acknowledge that the original grant of federal 
power in Article I of the Constitution was limited by the principle of state sovereignty.  See Bogen, 
supra note 74, at 362-63.  For those justices who have consistently objected to decisions 
constraining congressional authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, however, this argument 
stands as further support for their dissenting opinions. 
 102. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999) (concluding that the Patent Clause could not be relied upon to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment). 
 103. See Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (concluding, by a 
5-4 vote, that states are not immune from bankruptcy court orders). 
 104. See Rich, supra note 23, at 210-11. 
 105. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 105-51 (1994). 
 106. See Rich, supra note 23, at 211. 
 107. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 111-61 (2000) (arguing that the state in a good society must ensure fundamental human 
capabilities); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 124-28 (1996) (arguing that states must ensure some minimal level of basic goods); 
WEST, supra note 105. 
 108. See Rich, supra note 23, at 210-19. 
 109. It should be understood that this reference to “positive rights” is limited to rights 
identified by Congress and consistent with Article I limits on congressional power.  Furthermore, 
the only additional authority flowing from the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the power to stop 
state abridgement of these rights. 
15
Rich: Why "Privileges or Immunities"?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
10-RICH.DOC 7/6/2009  12:05 PM 
1126 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1111 
consequential damages should follow from contemporary recognition of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.110 
In practical terms, this means that Congress should have authority 
to protect state workers from age discrimination or from discrimination 
based upon disabilities by abrogating state immunity from such 
actions.111  It also means that the door should be reopened for 
enforcement of fair labor standards against state employers,112 and calls 
for elimination of the unworkable proposition that Congress lacks power 
to provide for enforcement of patent rights against state governments.113  
All responsibilities assigned to Congress under Article I of the 
Constitution should once again include the power to ensure state 
compliance with federal law.114 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Returning to the question of what the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment could have been thinking when they chose the phrase 
“privileges or immunities,”115 a transparent purpose emerges.  They 
cared about incorporation of the Bill of Rights, but that was only one 
element of their quest.  They cared about rights derived from the 
national character of the government, and assuring supremacy of 
statutory rights also had major significance at that point in history.  
 
 110. Ironically, the Slaughter-House Cases have been blamed for leading the courts down a 
path towards exclusive recognition of “negative” (rather than “positive”) rights.  See Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative Rights View of the 
Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 409-13 (1990).  Adding to the irony, one element of the 
critique of negative rights is that it places undue emphasis upon private property rights to the 
exclusion of rights of personal well being.  See Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs 
and the Bill of “Rights”: A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 457 (1992).  As 
explained above, Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion was most notable at the time it was 
issued for its rejection of claims to extensive private property rights.  See supra notes 57-67 and 
accompanying text. 
 111. Reversing conclusions reached by the United States Supreme Court include Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (blocking right to recover monetary damages for violation of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act) and Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356 (2001) (barring monetary damages against states for violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act). 
 112. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the principle of state sovereign 
immunity limited enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act in both state and federal courts). 
 113. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 114. This conclusion restores the plurality conclusion reached by the Supreme Court when it 
addressed the question of congressional power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 115. This phrase was used instead of a more easily defined alternative for the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s source of substantive rights. 
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“Privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” embraced all 
of these sources of law.  This conclusion is consistent with Congressman 
Bingham’s assurance at the time that the central purpose of this 
provision was simply to “bear true allegiance to the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.”116  It is also consistent with Justice Miller’s 
understanding that “privileges” and “immunities” include “nearly every 
civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized 
government is instituted,”117 but only those aspects that fall within the 
scope of federal authority are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.118 
It is time to breathe new life into the historical narrative that 
accompanies our understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.  To do so 
requires reconsideration of Justice Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion and 
resuscitation of the missing piece of the framework established by that 
opinion.  Restoration of federal statutory rights will result. 
 
 116. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). 
 117. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1873). 
 118. Id. at 78. 
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